I was recently asked what I considered “proven” nuclear technology. I think it’s more a question of what level of risk, expense, responsibility and consequences we are prepared to …
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I was recently asked what I considered “proven” nuclear technology. I think it’s more a question of what level of risk, expense, responsibility and consequences we are prepared to accept. Those are concerns that got short shrift back when the U.S. government was actively promoting nuclear energy in the 1950s, and we are living with the legacy of that. There are now many advanced reactor concepts being subsidized by the government and eagerly pursued by industry. All somewhat short of “proven,” which is an overrated credential in any case; many technologies were well-proven, in ghastly ways, in the last century. It’s a term devoid of moral value.
What came out of those original efforts was the light water reactor, which has been operating at scale, producing electricity without major mishaps, since the 1960s. That is a proven technology, in that we understand it, can repeat it, can operate it, and know its capabilities and its drawbacks.
The push for a new generation of “advanced” reactors, to replace those aging light water reactors is a good thing, if it’s done right, but it’s not just about the science. Politics, bureaucratic inertia and money outweigh good sense, in many human endeavors. The guys in white coats are not priests or saints, nor are their government sponsors, venture capitalists or paid spokesmen.
Many next-generation prototypes have been built and operated in the laboratory and on small, pilot plant scale, mostly by the government, which is now subsidizing further development by industry. That’s exactly what Bill Gates’ Natrium reactor in Kemmerer is — a government-subsidized pilot plant, the first of its kind. Reactors using HALEU (High Assay, Low-Enriched Uranium) fuel have not been built or operated on a commercial scale; and neither have reactors using liquid sodium (rather than water) as a coolant. Experimental sodium-cooled reactors have had a spotty record for decades, because molten sodium reacts with water to produce hydrogen, which can burn explosively in contact with air, leaking molten sodium itself burns in contact with air or water, and leaks do occur. TerraPower claims to have solved those problems; Wyoming will find out. Proven? We’ll see.
Radiant’s concept for portable, self-contained micro-reactors is promising, primarily for government. Almost all their pre-orders are for the Department of Defense. Why isn’t the government overseeing construction on the Nevada National Security Site — which already has several legacy, mothballed nuclear facilities, and areas the size of a small state already contaminated by nuclear weapons testing in the old days — instead of subsidizing a California startup to build it in our backyard? It certainly is not “proven” technology, as Radiant has not yet built or operated a single one of these reactors for testing, much less for quantity production and operation.
The primary concerns regarding nuclear power are nearly universal across the board:
• Spent nuclear fuel, aka high-level radioactive waste, remains dangerously radioactive for up to 100,000 years. There are only three options: deep, permanent geologic disposal, interim on-site surface storage (what Radiant proposes, and what every commercial reactor in America is doing), and reprocessing. We cannot “prove” viability of the first and second options, since the government hasn’t provided a permanent repository, and we’ve only had a few decades of monitored surface storage. Reprocessing is a known technology developed in World War II as a means of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. It does not exist in America, is extremely expensive and considered uneconomical by industry, and still leaves us with highly radioactive waste (albeit a smaller volume). We are making decisions for the foreseeable future of the human race, and need to take that seriously.
• Proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons grade material to aspiring nuclear weapons states. Look at what we’ve been through with Iran, to prevent them from producing enough highly enriched uranium to build a useful number of atomic weapons. Bill Gates’ Natrium “small modular reactor” is intended for high-volume global sales; but its HALEU fuel is only a few spins of the centrifuge away from weapons grade uranium; when spent it contains a high percentage of plutonium; and it could easily be configured to produce a great deal more.
• Economic viability of commercial nuclear power has always been a sham. It doesn’t pay for its catastrophic loss insurance (past a low threshold, that is guaranteed by the government); it doesn’t pay for a nuclear waste solution, because the federal government accepted responsibility for that 60-plus years ago, and still pays for all the “interim” solutions. The electricity produced in commercial nuclear plants would be uncompetitive if the industry had to pay these costs.
Among the “advanced reactor” concepts, there are a few with great potential, despite these challenges. Thorium-fueled reactors produce only a tiny volume of waste, have a much lower chance of catastrophic accidents, and do not use or produce weapons-grade materials. China is already operating commercial thorium-fueled reactors, but they have received very little interest from the U.S. government and industry. I’d give those Chinese plants a few years to “prove” they’re safe and economically viable, but they so far seem to be. Why aren’t we pursuing this solution? Follow the money.