Bill Tallen

That’s a quote from a genuine Arkansas redneck I worked with for many years, as profound as anything from the ancient sages. Yogi Berra put it this way: “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”

There’s a lot of head shaking going on about the Iran war. First question seems to be, “who ceased fire, anyway?”  The ceasefire looks like anything but. Since it began, Iran has continued to attack on its Arab neighbors, increasingly drawing direct retaliation from them; and to attack commercial vessels attempting to pass through the Strait of Hormuz without paying the Iranian tolls; and to attack U.S. warships or the bases that support them in the enforcement of our blockade of Iranian ports. The U.S. responds with heavy if intermittent U.S. counterstrikes on missile and drone storage and launch facilities, after all said missiles and drones have been shot down. Those strikes have been limited to the area of the Strait of Hormuz 

Some also point to the occasional actions by U.S. aircraft or warships against commercial vessels attempting to run the blockade. Since blockade is recognized as an act of war in its own right, these actions are really in a different category. The U.S. actions have been very precise and almost entirely casualty-free, for instance shells or missiles through the engine room after prior notice has been delivered to allow the evacuation of crews.

The ceasefire has really been mostly unilateral: U.S., Israeli, and allied airstrikes against Iranian military and infrastructure targets not involved in the Strait of Hormuz actions have ceased. Iran may have more missiles and drones than they have launched since the ceasefire, but we do not know, any more than we know whether the earlier drawdown of U.S. precision munitions has influenced the decision to limit offensive strikes.

The second major topic of confusion, after the illogic of calling the ongoing state of affairs a ceasefire, regards the goals and expectations of all parties in the on-again, off-again negotiations. Concessions have been offered by both sides, but none have been implemented. Iranian negotiators recently offered to open the Strait to all traffic, in exchange for a U.S. offer to lift the blockade. 

But those are very asymmetric conditions: The blockade is pushing Iran’s economy toward a hard collapse into chaos, closer every day, while the rest of the world is paying higher gas prices at the pump — painful but not critical. In any case, nothing has happened. Iran still attacks ships in the Strait, has not cleared its mines, and continues fruitless attacks on American forces involved in the blockade; and consequently, the blockade remains in force.

In particular, we keep seeing indications of something noted by serious observers as early as mid-March: There appears to be no unitary leadership in Iran. In the talks leading up to the recent 60-day ceasefire extension we saw handshake agreements on the key terms (Strait opened and blockade ended) on one day and renewed large-scale Iranian attacks in the Strait on the very next day.

The factions wielding power in Iran right now include the ayatollahs, the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), politicians in the government bureaucracy, and the regular military. To say the least, they do not speak with the same voice. The most cohesive faction appears to be the IRGC, but their centralized command structure was devastated in the first weeks of the war, and they themselves bragged about their decentralized “mosaic” defense concept. Thirty provinces plus Tehran each had quasi-independent command and extensive military resources, allowing them to continue functioning according to standing orders even after the centralized command structure was “decapitated” by enemy action. 

Some of the ongoing Iranian attacks, in complete discord with the negotiations being conducted by their government, may indicate that “mosaic” strategy is still in place. No one is in charge. Even if their diplomats negotiate in good faith, they lack the power and influence to ensure compliance with any commitments they make.  And they certainly know it.

So once again, all we can ask is “who benefits?” by the current state of affairs. Various factions in Iran clearly believe they can survive under the ceasefire and ongoing U.S. blockade, and that delay benefits them. They believe that America is also disunited, and that it lacks the patience to see this through. Unfortunately, there are signs that they may be right.

It is harder to understand why President Trump and his advisors persist with the ceasefire, when the political costs mount steadily. America has a long tradition of accepting military actions when they are short, decisive and victorious. There will come a point where even the President’s base will lose patience and he will lose support in the run-up to the midterm elections, which he sees correctly as vital to the nation’s future. What is he thinking?  Hard telling.