Bill Tallen

Nothing died except a poor business plan, but it’s a good time to step back from the victory laps and recriminations that followed Radiant Industries’ withdrawal of its proposal for a micro-reactor manufacturing and servicing plant outside Bar Nunn. Now that the dust has settled somewhat, here are my observations, an after-action review if you will. No hidden bias here: it’s on display.

First, why did they go? Radiant claims they pulled out because of “regulatory uncertainty” in Wyoming. This is an indirect acknowledgement that their entire business plan depended upon changing existing Wyoming law to allow open-ended surface storage of high-level radioactive waste (spent reactor fuel) on their Natrona County premises. Radiant does not acknowledge the wave of unruly resistance by citizens, or the opposition of the Freedom Caucus in the Wyoming House of Representatives, but of course those are what cast the wet blanket of “uncertainty” on their plans. To have proceeded confidently, sinking substantial funds into the project without that statutory change in their hands, would have been folly. 

Some argued that proceeding full-speed before even building a prototype of their microreactor for operational and safety tests might also have been unwise, but now Oak Ridge, Tennessee, their new prospective home, can sort that out. Oak Ridge, central to the Manhattan Project and one hub of the government transportation network for nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials I was once involved in, certainly has decades of experience in nuclear endeavors of many sorts and will undoubtedly bring considerable expertise to bear. Ask me sometime for the radioactive frog goo in tire treads story.

There were other concerns regarding Radiant’s plan. These included road wear, traffic impact, and safety and security risks of the hundreds of shipments they would put on our highways, after reaching their planned production goal of 50 new units every year, with regular refueling of every one back in Bar Nunn. 

I participated in public discussions — in person and online — over the summer, and have been in listening mode since. A recurring theme from the pro-Radiant side is that it was normal and acceptable to believe that all the waste storage and transportation concerns would be addressed, because the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates the industry and would ensure all standards are met. This circular reasoning was the rationale behind Radiant’s shameless statements that they were “learning as they go” and that they would be safe because ... they have to be safe. Never mind that their proposed operation was in several respects unprecedented. Existing regulations were not necessarily applicable. For instance, government spent fuel shipments are required to use massive containers weighing 260 tons loaded, fully certified after extensive full-scale testing, for legacy low-enriched uranium fuel rods. Yet their safety record was touted to promote Radiant’s plan to transport TRISO spent fuel inside their microreactor, not a purpose-built shipping container, on the back of a flatbed trailer that weighs 70 tons fully loaded — shielding and all. Their reactor has not been subjected to any of those tests. If it were tested (and not just modelled on company computers) and failed, what then? Especially if state law had been amended, and the state, the community, and the company were already fully invested in construction of the facility, and in a suddenly invalidated business plan? At best we would have seen delays, cost overruns, litigation, exceptions and waivers, or combinations of all these. Would the NRC remain an honest broker, free from political and economic influence? Would the U.S. Department of Energy, the sponsor, promoter and disburser of significant federal funds for a range of “next-generation” nuclear tech, suddenly be an honest broker? History supports a degree of skepticism.

This short recap of challenges and concerns regarding Radiant’s plans is my answer to the orchestrated chorus of “nuclear — good and necessary!” and “opposition — stupid and bad!” that skeptics were subjected to for months, from inexpert officials at local, county and state levels; and from industry spokesmen, paid and unpaid; and from ‘experts’ in federal agencies who are paid to be impartial public servants, not boosters of private sector projects. 

The pro-Radiant camp threw insults and ad hominem attacks as if from a playbook: “fear mongering” and “anti-science” and “anti-growth” and “Club No,” so consistently they almost sounded like Democrats. The opposition was by contrast undisciplined, spontaneous, inconsistent and generally more civil. Its most admirable traits were a realistic attention to risk, and to the fallible human element in complex systems. 

Nuclear is an important and promising energy option; but it has had a spotty record when it comes to honesty and transparency in public relations, and in attention to public and environmental health. Has there ever been a human technology immune to human error or miscalculation? This is why we watch, critically.